Attachment-3

Vote by Mail

Table 1 - Vote by Mail, Process Needs

Service or Product	Number of Units	Affiliated Costs/Resources	Notes	
Vote by Mail kits	10,000	\$12,000	7000 kits remaining from 2022 can be re-used. The cost of remaining kits up to 10,000 is estimated in the cost shown.	
			Accounting for inflation estimate is based on \$4 per kit.	
			Kits include secrecy envelope, blank copies of declaration forms, and return envelope.	
Vendor services		\$13,750	Vendor platform used to request, track, audit and adjudicate mail in ballots when returned.	
			Based on vendor implication to expect increase of costs to be 25% from previous agreement.	
Postage to send mail kits		\$19,100	Postage rate of 0.93 cents per mailed envelope to send and 0.98 cents for pre-paid postage to return.	
Image Cast Central Optical Scan, ballot tabulator		\$6,000	Processes ballots at a higher speed, in comparison to voting location tabulators, to facilitate results tabulation on election night.	
			Assuming slight increase per unit from 2022 to 2026	
Fulfilling requests	1000	2-3 CCO staff, dedicating 50% capacity during advanced voting period	 Review requests, and check against Voter List. Print Declaration Form, and select ballot. Prepare kit including ballot, declaration form, and information slip. Out-going mail, City Hall (managed by Service Guelph 	
		periou	staff).	

Vote by Mail

Table 2 - Vote by Mail, Process Needs Continued

Service or	Number	Affiliated	Notes
Product	of Units	Costs/Resources	
Receiving process	1000	2 CCO staff	Minimum 2-person activity to ensure the kits are opened in
		dedicating 5-10%	the presence of at least one other election official as a
		capacity during	witness.
		advanced voting	1. Review signature of declaration.
		period	2. Scan declaration barcode, to strike voter from list.
			3. Store ballot in secure location until they are fed through
			tabulator on Election day.

Process Needs Summary

Total Estimated Costs: \$50,850

Total Person Resource Needs:

- 2-3 City Clerk's Office staff dedicated to upwards of 50% of time to fulfilling voting method.
- During the 2022 Municipal and School Board Election, 593 kits were requested and 464 were received back. Resource numbers are based on previous election demands and number of personnel who executed the process.
- Additional time to be expected for regular operational out-going mail tasks at City Hall, due to volume increases.
- Beyond 1000 requests, CCO would require additional assistance from third-party affiliates, networks, and other City resources, where possible.

Vote by Mail

Table 3 - VBM, SWOT Analysis

Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats (Risks)
Accessible, remote voting option	Prolonged return time	Familiar process from previous election, chance to further refine	Third-party dependency (Canada Post)
	Accessibility limits due to return process through mail		Voter fraud, possible
	Receipt of ballots beyond the deadline		Mail threat (harmful content)
	Limited timeframe due to ballot printing and mail timelines		Inaccurate ballot casting not verified by the voter

SWOT Summary

Accessible option, with a familiar and tested process, that has relatively benign weaknesses/threats affiliated.

Table 4 – VBM, Emergency Risk Management Framework (ERMF)

Risk	Impact	Likelihood	Overall Risk Rating
Third-party dependency	4	1	4
(Canada Post)	7	_	7
Voter Fraud, possible	2	2	4
Mail threat (harmful	2	2	4
content)	2	2	4
Inaccurate ballot casting		4	4
not verified by the voter	_	4	4

ERMF Summary

Overall, a very low risk level alternative voting method.

Vote from Home

Table 5 - VFH Process Needs

Service or Product	Number of Units	Affiliated Costs/Resources	Notes
Booking Process	60	1 CCO staff, dedicating minimal time	Receiving requests for a Vote from Home appointment, verify qualifying reasons, verification of Voter's List, scheduling appointment.
			60 appointments noted as an estimate based on amount of local use in provincial and federal elections shared by the Returning Officer. If approved, a cap would not be used in 2026 as it was in 2022 for the pilot.
External staffing		1 CCO staff, dedicated minimal time	Includes recruitment and training process.
Fulfilling requests		\$5440.00	2 election officials travel together, for 60 appointments over a 4 day period (with inflationary costs, assumed rate of pay for ballot officers is\$340.00/person/day)
Receiving Process		2 CCO staff dedicating minimal time	Minimum 2-person activity to ensure the kits are opened in the presence of at least one other election official as a witness. 1. Review signature of declaration. 2. Scan declaration barcode, to strike voter from list. 3. Store ballot in secure location until they are fed through tabulator on Election Day.

Process Needs Summary

Total Cost: \$5,440.00

Overall cost is the lowest of alternative voting methods, when adhering to limited appointment times reserved for those with qualifying reasons. Cost per vote is relatively high at \$90.67/appointment booking.

Vote from Home

Total Person Resource needed:

- 1 designated CCO staff member can both coordinate bookings with the public and liaise the selected ballot officers.
- At peak, the highest capacity need would be during the receiving process, which could be done in tandem with the Vote by Mail method, should it be selected as a voting method.

Vote from Home

Table 6 - VFH, SWOT Analysis

Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats (Risks)
Low Cost	Invasive practice to enter peoples' homes	Familiar process from previous election, chance to further refine	Entering peoples' homes, security, and privacy risk
Highly Accessible	Growth and scalability has limits	Low risk of fraud	
Easy to implement			

SWOT Summary

Benefits of high level of accessibility, low cost and ability to implement a familiar process, with minimal opportunity for weakness or threats. The greatest concern is this method is limited growth and scalability, and is limited by qualifying reasons to use this method.

Table 7 - VFH, Emergency Risk Management Framework (ERMF)

Risk	Impact	Likelihood	Overall Risk Rating
Entering peoples' homes, security, and privacy risk	1	1	1

ERMF Summary

The lowest risk alternative voting method.

Internet Voting

Table 8 - Internet Voting, Process Needs

Service or	Number	Affiliated	Notes
Product	of Units	Costs/Resources	
Internet Voting	10,000	\$16,000	Vendor estimate for 2026.
System			
External Audit of		\$20,000	This amount is estimated for penetration level testing.
System			Increased threat risk level testing could increase audit costs
		1-2 staff, working	to closer to \$40,000.
		with third party	
Internal training		1 responsible, 2-3	Full time focus during a concentrated period of time.
		supports	
L & A Testing		1 responsible, 2-3	Full time focus during a concentrated period of time.
		supports	
Call Centre/Public		1 responsible, 2-3	Expected increase call volumes, technology troubleshooting
Inquiries		supports (if	inquiries from the public.
		needed)	

Process Needs Summary

Total Estimated Costs: \$36,000 - \$56,000.

Total Person Resources Needed:

• Upwards of 2-3 City Clerk's Office staff would need to dedicate most of their time in the 1-3 months leading up to the election to fulfill this method.

Internet Voting

Table 9 - IV, SWOT Analysis

Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats (Risks)
Most Accessible Option	Variance in public technology literacy and access	Possible increase in voter turnout, due to convenience *	Malicious actors posing security risk
High-level of convenience	Need for accurate voter list and voter notification delivery	Complimentary with new EO Voter Portal	Compromised reliability to verify recount
Public sentiment supports		Pilot draft standards	Voter fraud, possible
			Technical reliance outside of City control

SWOT Summary

With the high level of accessibility and opportunity to provide convenience to voters, comes concerning threats that could impact the election outcomes.

Table 10 - IV, Emergency Risk Management Framework (ERMF)

Risk	Impact	Likelihood	Overall Risk Rating
Malicious actors posing security risk	4	2	8
Less reliability to verify recount	4	3	12
Voter fraud, possible	2	2	4
Technical reliance outside of City control	4	4	16

ERMF Summary

High level risks affiliated with this voting method, that include malicious cyber-attacks, technical reliance, and compromised ability to perform a recount in any other way.

Vote By Phone

Table 11 - Vote by Phone, Process Needs

Service or	Number	Affiliated	Notes
Product	of Units	Costs/Resources	
Internet Voting	10,000	\$16,000	Vendor estimate for 2026.
System			
External Audit of		\$20,000	This amount is estimated for penetration level testing.
System			Increased threat risk level testing could increase audit costs
		1-2 staff, working	to closer to \$40,000.
		with third party	
Internal training		1 responsible, 2-3	Full time focus during a concentrated period of time.
		supports	
L & A Testing		1 responsible, 2-3	Full time focus during a concentrated period of time.
		supports	
Call Centre/Public		1 responsible, 2-3	Expected increase call volumes, technology troubleshooting
Inquiries		supports (if	inquiries from the public.
		needed)	

Process Needs Summary

Total Estimated Costs: \$36,000 - \$56,000.

Total Person Resources Needed:

• Upwards of 2-3 City Clerk's Office staff would need to dedicate most of their time in the 1-3 months leading up to the election to fulfill this method.

Vote By Phone

Table 12 - VBP, SWOT Analysis

Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats (Risks)
Very accessible	Prohibitively slow, poor customer service option (often results in incomplete cast)		Malicious actors posing security risk
Minimal technology literacy (compared to internet voting)			Compromised reliability to verify recount
			Voter fraud, possible
			Technical reliance outside of City control

SWOT Summary

With the high level of accessibility and opportunity to provide convenience to voters, comes concerning threats that could impact the election outcomes.

Table 13 - VBP, Emergency Risk Management Framework (ERMF)

Risk	Impact	Likelihood	Overall Risk Rating
Malicious actors posing security risk	4	2	8
Compromised reliability to verify recount	4	3	12
Voter fraud, possible	2	2	4
Technical reliance outside of City control	4	4	16

ERMF Summary

High level threats affiliated with this voting method, that include malicious cyber-attacks, technical reliance outside City control, and compromised ability to perform a recount in any other way.

Remote Accessible Vote by Mail (RAVBM)

Table 14 - RAVBM, Process Needs

Service or	Number	Affiliated	Notes
Product	of Units	Costs/Resources	
RAVBM Voting	10,000	\$12,950	Ballots are marked electronically and printed by the voter.
System			
Postage		\$9,800	Postage rate of 0.98 cents for pre-paid postage to return.
External Audit of		\$20,000	This amount is estimated for penetration level testing.
System			Increased threat risk level testing could increase audit costs to closer to \$40,000.
Internal training		1 rosponsible 2.2	
Internal training		1 responsible, 2-3 supports	Full time focus during a concentrated period of time.
L & A Testing		1 responsible, 2-3	Full time focus during a concentrated period of time.
		supports	
Fulfilling Request		1 responsible, 2-3 supports	Full time focus during a concentrated period of time.
Receiving Process		2 CCO persons	Minimum 2-person activity to ensure the kits are opened in
		dedicating minimal	the presence of at least one other election official as a
		time	witness.
			4. Review signature of declaration.
			5. Scan declaration barcode, to strike voter from list.
			Store ballot in secure location until they are fed through tabulator on Election Day.

Process Needs Summary

Total Estimated Costs: \$42,750 - \$62,750.

Total Person Resources Needed:

• Upwards of 2-3 City Clerk's Office staff would need to dedicate most of their time in the 1-3 months leading up to the election to fulfill this method.

Remote Accessible Vote by Mail (RAVBM)

Table 15 - RAVBM, SWOT Analysis

Strengths	Weaknesses	Opportunities	Threats (Risks)
Accessible	No precedent of having been done in Canada	Scoping out a new accessible voting method option	Third-party dependency (Canada Post)
Includes a hard-copy recount option	Dependent on access and efficacy of a printer		Voter fraud, possible
	Untested, and many unknowns about the process needs		Mail threat (harmful content)
	Receipt of ballots beyond the deadline		Inaccurate ballot casting not verified by the voter
			Malicious actors posing security risk
			Results challenge around MEA Compliance
			Technical reliance outside of City control

SWOT Summary

An accessible option, which includes some steps that may be a barrier for some voters to complete including printer use and mail return of ballot, complemented with various threats that also apply to Internet Voting/Vote by Phone, combined with threats affiliated with Vote by Mail.

Remote Accessible Vote by Mail (RAVBM)

Table 16 - RAVBM, Emergency Risk Management Framework (ERMF)

Risk	Impact	Likelihood	Overall Risk Rating
Third-party dependency (Canada Post)	4	1	4
Voter fraud, possible	2	2	4
Mail threat (harmful content)	2	2	4
Inaccurate ballot casting not verified by the voter	1	4	4
Malicious actors posing security risk	4	2	8
Technical reliance outside of City control	4	4	16
Results challenge around MEA Compliance	4	1	4

ERMF Summary

High level risks affiliated with this voting method, that include malicious cyber-attacks, technical reliance outside of City control.